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THE NEXT INNING OF FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS
By ISRAEL PACKEL t
Congress has just finished pinch hitting in the long-lasting family
partnership feud.' Has it "sewed up" the game, has it struck out, or
has it evened the score so that it is touch and go in the contest be-
tween taxpayers and tax collectors? An answer must be prefaced by
the admission that the analogy creates difficulty since there will be
disagreement as to whether Congress was batting for the taxpayers or
for the tax collectors.
Too much history on the taxation of family partnerships is not re-
quired, since so much has already been written up to the Culbertson I
chapter in 1949.8 The unusual determination of that case is exempli-
fied by an opinion of the Court by Chief Justice Vinson, concurring
opinions by Justice Burton and by Justice Frankfurter, and separate
notations as to the views of Justices Black and Rutledge and of Justice
Jackson. It can be said that this last pronouncement of the Supreme
Court established the very general rule, for whatever it may be worth,
that a family partnership is no different, taxwise, from any other
partnership so long as the parties "really and truly intended to," ' and
actually did, form the partnership. Thus, the way appeared to be open
for taxpayers to reduce the taxes payable to the collector by taking rela-
tives or others into paytnership.
t B.S. 1929, LL.B. 1932, LL.M. 1933, University of Pennsylvania; member of the
Philadelphia Bar; author of THE LAw oF CooPERATiVss (2d ed. 1947); and con-
tributor to legal periodicals.
1. Pub. Law No. 183, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 20, 1951).
2. Comm'r v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949).
3. See, e.g., Bruton, Family Partnerships and the Inwome Tax-The Cdbertson
Chapter, 98 U. oF PA. L. REv. 143 (1949).
4. The Court, 337 U.S. 733, 741-743, in stressing this subjective test, relied on
language quoted from Comm'r v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 287 (1946).
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The reduction in taxes can be visualized by the following com-
parative approximate figures for 1951 as to A, who has two daughters,
B and C, and whose only asset is a business which produces a net
income of $150,000:
Sole Proprietorship Family Partnership
Tax on A for Tax on A for $50,000 $25,000
$150,000 $110,000 Tax on B for $50,000 25,000
Tax on C for $50,000 25,000
Total Tax $110,000 Total Tax $75,000
Thus, if they really and truly formed a partnership, the taxes payable
by the family would be $75,000 instead of $110,000. Of course, if A
is married, he already has the benefit of splitting the income between
himself and his wife, so that in such a case, the maximum family tax
saving would result by giving B and C smaller interests, but the
over-all saving would be less than $35,000.
An important factor which, though obvious, must nonetheless be
kept in mind, is that the saving is not to A. As sole proprietor, he
owns the business, and his income after taxes is $40,000. As a partner,
he owns only one-third of the business, he may have some gift tax lia-
bility, and his income after taxes is $25,000. The true saving goes
to the other members of the partnership, or to the family if it is con-
sidered as a collective unit. Congress does for certain tax purposes
consider the family as a unit,5 but Courts should not resort to abstract
economic theories to change tax patterns.0
A purported family partnership might not have been really and
truly a partnership either before or after Culberston, for any one of
the following reasons:
(1) the partnership might have been a sham, because the parties
agreed that the paper transactions were to save taxes and not to be
otherwise effective; '
5. See, e.g.,l INT. REV. CODE §§24(b)l(A), 503(a)2.
6. But see the caustic (yet humorous and learned) opinion of Chief Judge
Hutcheson in Batman v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1951). He speaks of the"over thrifty and under candid" arrangement for "familial sharing" whereby a tax-
payer would like to "have his cake and eat it too," and by the magic talisman of the
word "partnership" attempts to engage in "shoring up and expanding the family
fortunes at the expense of the tax collector."
7. "The question always is whether the transaction under scrutiny is in fact what
it appears to be in form; a marriage may be a joke; a contract may be intended only
to deceive others; an agreement may have a collateral defeasance." L. Hand, J., in
Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1935).
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(2) it might have been, in effect, merely a contract to assign
future income, because the business was a personal service business or
because the only interest of a partner was in future income; 8 or
(3) it might have been so unusual in the terms of the agree-
ment 9 or in the actual operation of the partnership, as to permit the
former owner to retain practically all the normal incidents of own-
ership.10
A great source of confusion had been the failure on the part of
accountants, tax collectors, lawyers and judges to recognize the dif-
ference between matters of evidence and rules of law. Failure of an
alleged partner to provide personal services or to provide capital origi-
nating outside the business might have been of some evidentiary value
in attacking the reality of the partnership but as the Culbertson case
pointed out no rule of law ever existed which required either one of
these factors for the formation of a partnership.
POST-CULBERTSON ERA
The post-Culbertson era produced in its wake a tremendous
amount of litigation. In fact, in the two year period, thirty-seven
family partnership cases were decided by United States Courts of
Appeal, and hundreds of such cases were before the Tax Court and
District Courts. Although the cases deal primarily with questions of
fact,1 it might be of some advantage to set up a box score to show
how taxpayers have fared in the appellate courts since Culbertson.
Extreme caution must always be exercised in attempting to make any
deductions from bare statistics of results. The following is a box score
of all the cases involving family partnerships which have been decided
by Courts of Appeal since Culbertson:
8. The Supreme Court had already held such alleged partnerships ineffective,
Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932) ; cf. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
A logical extension exists under the rule of Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948)
where the former owner retains control over the source of income or has a right of
recapture. Stanton v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1951). This rule, however,
should not preclude a joint venture interest in a partnership interest. In United
States v. Atkins, 191 F.2d 146, reversing, 189 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1951), the Court
reversed itself on a rehearing of this issue.
9. Normal restrictions on all partners or management powers in one partner will
not defeat the partnership. This is evident from the limited partnership cases. Lamb
v. Smith, 183 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Greenberger v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 990 (7th
Cir. 1949). But cf. Giffen v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1951) where the Court
agreed that the limited partners had been given a bare expectancy.
10. In Morrison v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 351, 352 (2d Cir. 1949) a per curiam opinion
affirmed the Tax Court which had found that the evidence "gives us a picture of a
man who was not a partner but in reality a sole proprietor."
11. It has aptly been pointed out that it serves no real purpose to ferret out a part
of the facts of analogous cases, since no one fact can be decisive. Eisenberg v. Comm'r,
161 F.2d 506, 510 (3d Cir. 1947).
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Family Partnership Cases in Courts of Appeal
Affirmed Reversed
for for
Fact Finding Body Taxpayer Collector Taxpayer Collector
Tax Court 0 1312 11 1 0
Jury 214 21' 0 0
Judge 716 1 17 1 18 0
Total 9 16 12 0
Thus, of the cases appealed to Courts of Appeal, the score stands 21
to 16 in favor of the taxpayers, and all twelve reversals were in favor
of the taxpayers.
What generalizations can fairly be drawn from these figures?
Significantly, it is to be noted that there were twenty-four appeals from
Tax Court decisions in favor of the government, eleven of which re-
sulted in reversals in favor of the taxpayers. The fact that there is
not a single appeal by the collector from a Tax Court decision in favor
of a taxpayer is a sign that the collector was apparently satisfied with
the slant of the Tax Court in these cases.1" The fact that all four jury
verdicts in these cases were upheld is some evidence that the Courts
12. Anderson v. Comm'r, 185 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Barrett v. Comm'r, 185
F.2d 150 (1st Cir. 1950) ; Batman v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1951); Buckley
v. Comm'r, 180 F.2d 749 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Collamer v. Comm'r, 185 F.2d 146 (4th Cir.
1950); Feldman v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1950); Giffen v. Comnn'r, 190
F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1951); Mendelsohn v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 306 (3d Cir. 1951);
Morrison v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 351 (2d Cir. 1949); Nelsen v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 203
(6th Cir. 1949) ; Nelson v. Comm'r, 184 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Stanton v. Comm'r,
189 F.2d 297 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Wester v. Comm'r, 189 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1951).
13. Ardolina v. Comm'r, 186 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1951); Britt Est. v. Comm'r,
4 P-H 1951 FED. TAx SEnv. 1172,539 (5th Cir. 1951); Cobb v. Comm'r, 185 F.2d
255 (6th Cir. 1950); Denning & Co. v. Comm'r, 180 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1950):
Eckhard v. Comm'r, 182 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1950); Greenberger v. Comm'r, 177
F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Johns v. Comm'r, 180 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Maiatico
v. Comm'r, 183 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Miller v. Comm'r, 183 F.2d 246 (6th
Cir. 1950) ; Wenig v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Yost v. Comm'r, 4 P-H
1951 FED. TAx SERv. 1172,482 (5th Cir. 1951).
14. Lamb v. Smith, 183 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1950); Thompson v. Riggs, 175 F.2d
81 (8th Cir. 1949).
15. Parker v. Westover, 186 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1950) ; Stanback v. Robertson, 183
F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1950).
16. Arnold v. Green, 186 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Crossley v. Campbell, 184 F.2d
639 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Glenn v. Cooke, 177 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1949) ; Jones v. Baker,
189 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1951) ; Jones v. Trapp, 186 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Rupple
v. Kuhl, 177 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1949); United States v. Atkins, 191 F.2d 146, re-
versing 189 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1951).
17. Trapp v. United States, 177 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949).
18. Ginsburg v. Arnold, 185 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1950).
19. ". . . the Tax Court has proven, thus far, to be an unduly Treasury-minded
forum in family-partnership controversies . . . ." Landman, Family Partnerships
and the Reality Test, 28 TAXES 551, 559 (1950).
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really consider these issues as factual.' Finally, a weak inference 21
of the desirability to a taxpayer of a trial without a jury is to be
gleaned from the fact that trial judges decided the factual issue seven
times in favor of the taxpayer and twice in favor of the collector.
The most important conclusion to be drawn from these cases is
the correctness of the old suggestion that there was "crying need for
a further clarification of the family partnership situation under the
Internal Revenue Code." 2 The possible variation in result, depending
upon whether a taxpayer has enough money to pay the tax and sue
for his refund in the District Court, as opposed to delaying payment
with the hope of winning an uphill battle in the Tax Court, should be
shocking to all moral sense. Manifestly, no statute or regulation is
going to end all the litigation, but certainly there was the need for
Congressional action.
THE 1951 CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The compromise of a bitter battle in 1950 eliminated Senate spon-
sored action as to family partnerships, but apparently with the under-
standing that the House would assent to action in 1951.1 Accordingly,
the Revenue Bill of 195 1,24 introduced in the House on June 15, 1951,
contained provisions affecting family partnerships. The provisions as
reported by the Senate Finance Committee25 were substantially similar,
except that the Senate Bill was made applicable under certain conditions
to all tax years after 1938 instead of after 1950.
The Revenue Bill of 1951 ' as finally enacted deals with family
partnerships in section 340 which contains three subdivisions. Sub-
division (a) adds to the definition of a partnership which appears in
§ 3797 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code, a statement that a partner
shall be recognized for tax purposes "if he owns a capital interest in
a partnership in which capital is a material income-producting factor,
20. "The learned trial judge wisely submitted interrogatories to the jury which
pinpointed the ultimate issues of the case. Finally, those issues of fact being resolved
by the jury, they are beyond our reach, for it is well-settled, indeed it would be a work
of supererogation now to attempt to prove, that the historical function of the jury can-
not be the subject of interference when the evidence permits reasonable minds to dis-
agree." Lamb v. Smith, 183 F.2d 938, 942 (3d Cir. 1950). The legislative repeal
of the Dobson rule [Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489 (1943)] means that Tax Court
decisions are now subject to the same review as District Court decisions in civil actions
tried without a jury. INT. REv. Con § 1141(a).
21. The inference is weak because it disregards the results in all the trials which
have never been appealed.
22. Bruton, supra note 3, at 160.
23. 2 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 3264 (1950).
24. H.R. 4473, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 313 (1951).
25. Ibid., as reported in the Senate on September 18, 1951, § 339.
26. See note 1 supra.
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whether or not such interest was derived by purchase or gift." Sub-
division (b) adds to the Code a new section to permit, for tax pur-
poses, the reallocation by the collector of partnership income in dis-
regard of the partnership agreement where (1) a partnership interest
is created by gift or sale to a member of the family27 and (2) the
transferor is not allowed by the partnership arrangement reasonable
compensation for his personal, services or a proportionate return for
his share of capital, with the qualification that there should be no reallo-
cation because of absence due to military service. Subsection (c)
makes the provisions effective as to taxable years after December 31,
1950, and contains the caveat that no inferences are to be drawn from
the fact that the provisions are not expressly made applicable to previous
taxable years.
This general statement of the statutory changes makes it rather
manifest that family partnership problems are not ended. There is the
matter of determining whether capital is a material income-producing
factor, and the effect to be given a negative determination. Then there
are the problems as to when there should be reallocations of income,
and the practical bases on which they are to be made. Finally, there
are the questions relating to the retrospective effect of the legislation.
1. Capital as a Material Income-Producing Factor
The declared purpose of the new provisions to clarify the recog-
nition of family partnerships for tax purposes is based upon the premise
that the real ownership of an interest in a partnership should not differ
taxwise from the ownership of any other asset.28 If A owns an office
building, there appears to be no reason for refusing to recognize the
transaction taxwise whether: (1) A conveys one-half of the fee to B,
his daughter; (2) A forms a corporation with that asset and turns
over one-half of the shares to B; or (3) A takes B into partnership by
giving her a one-half interest in the office building as a partnership
asset. The concept that a special business purpose must be the motive
for the creation of a partnership interest, should now be eliminated
completely.
29
27. "Family" is defined in this new section to include only "spouse, ancestors, and
lineal descendents, and any trust for the primary benefit of such persons." Significantly,
collateral relatives are thereby excluded from the effect of this new section.
28. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1951). An actual transfer of
legal ownership of business assets to family members presents essentially the same
problem as the formation of a family partnership. Visintainer v. Comm'r, 187 F.2d
519 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 20 U.S.L. W=-x 3103 (Oct. 23, 1951).
29. SEN. Rm. No. 781, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1951); cf. United States v.
Cumberland Public Service Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950), where it is held that business
motive may be relevant in determining whether a transfer in liquidation followed by a
sale made by the shareholders is real or a sham, but if the transaction is real the lack
of business motive is not significant.
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Under the new legislation, and assuming that the transaction is
not a sham, a partner's right to share in profits will have to be recog-
nized if he owns some of the capital which is a material income-
producing factor. The requirement of a capital interest, as well as
profit-sharing, is in accordance with traditional concepts. The Uniform
Partnership Act, for instance, provides in section 7 that profit sharing
is prima facie evidence of a partnership. Here again, matters of evi-
dence are not to be confused with a legal rule. Profit sharing alone
does not create a partnership. "The indispensable requisites of a part-
nership are co-ownership of a business and the sharing of its profits." 1o
Justice Holmes, in a leading case involving the tort liability of asso-
ciates in business activity, has pointed out the danger of basing the
result on whether the association is to be given the tag of "partner-
ship."" The objection to the disregard of the tag in a tax case is
that Congress has seen fit to use that tag and hence its use as the
litmus paper to test tax results is justifiable.
The new legislation provides no test to determine whether capital
is a material income-producing factor. The historical use of the phrase
makes it clear that even in a personal service business, capital can still
be a material income-producing factor." Determinations as to whether
capital is a material income-producing factor will turn on evidence as
to the total amount of capital, the use to which the capital is put, the
nature of the business, the type of assets and the relationship of income
to proprietorship services. No specific rule can control. A back-
handed, yet practical, approach in the light of the purpose of the deter-
mination, would be testimony as to whether the death of one or more
of the partners would tend substantially to end the income of the
partnership.
There is no express statement in the new legislation to cover the
situation where capital is not a material income-producing factor.34
30. Schuster v. Largman, 308 Pa. 520, 528, 162 Ati. 305, 307 (1932).
31. Guy v. Donald, 203 U.S. 399, 405-6 (1906).
32. For tax years prior to January 1, 1944, the expression was used in connection
with an earned income credit and the regulations expressly recognized that personal
services and capital can each be material income-producing factors. U.S. TREAs.
REG. 111, §29.185-1 (1943).
33. Thus the regulations with respect to the old earned income credit provide:
"No general rule can be prescribed defining the trades or businesses in which per-
sonal services and capital are material income-producing factors, but this question must
be determined with respect to the facts of the individual cases." U.S. TREAs. REG.
111, §29.25-2 (1943).
34. In Greenberger v. Comm'r, 177 F.2d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 1949) the Tax Court's
decision in favor of the collector was reversed even though it had found that "Capital
was not a material income producing factor in the operation of the business." The
Court of Appeals admitted that the invested capital was small but stressed that "the
parties stood ready to contribute further capital, if needed, . . . and, of course, they
were personally liable for the liabilities of the partnership."
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Does the provision mean that an architect, for example, cannot take
his own son into partnership to carry on their profession, and have
it recognized as valid by the taxing authorities? The provision is a
direction as to a particular situation in which a family partnership
should be recognized, and it does not purport to exclude other situa-
tions from being similarly recognized. Its primary purpose as already
stated is to avoid any distinction in the recognition of a partnership
based upon whether the interest is ultimately traced to an actual pur-
chase or a gift.
A person can become a partner even though his capital account
may start at zero. The employee who is taken in as a partner often
starts on that basis. Title to the business assets, even though only
office furniture, passes to the partnership, so that there is co-ownership.
The partner who starts with no capital, nonetheless, has in this typical
case an interest in capital assets as they accumulate. Thus, even though
capital is not a material income-producing factor, a partnership can
be valid taxwise, if supported by facts other than a gift of a capital
interest.
2. Reallocation of Income in Disregard of Partnership Agreement.
The Culbertson case expressly left open the matter of reallocation
of income as between partners. "No question as to the allocation of
income between capital and services is presented in this case, and we
intimate no opinion on that subject." 3 5 The Eighth Circuit in the
Hartz case, 6 following the lead of the Sixth Circuit in the Canfield 8'
and Woolsey " cases, had held that if the family partnership is valid,
the tax collector cannot, for tax purposes, rewrite the provisions of the
partnership agreement. On the same day the Culbertson case was
decided, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Hartz case in which
the government had asked for a review of this issue of reallocation.3"
No case since then has decided this issue in favor of the collector, but
there is not much doubt that many cases involving the validity of the
partnership were compromised on the basis of a reallocation of income.
The new legislation now swings the pendulum the other way, so
that reallocation of income under certain circumstances is provided for
under a new section 191 of the Code. It means that after establish-
ing the validity of the partnership, the taxpayer must also satisfy the
35. 337 U.S. 733, 748 (1949).
36. Hartz v. Comm'r, 170 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1948).
37. Canfield v. Conm'r, 168 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1948).
38. Woosley v. Comm'r, 168 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1948).
39. 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
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tax collector with respect to the distribution of profits. The effective-
ness of the new section will depend, to a great extent, upon the manner
in which it is administered. An enlightened approach, from the stand-
point of the real evil which it is designed to meet, will probably limit
its use to cases where the over-all financial relationship of the parties is
clearly unreasonable.
Specifically, the new section provides that for tax purposes reallo-
cation of income, contrary to the terms of a valid family partnership
agreement, is not to take place unless the former owner is not receiving
reasonable compensation for his services or a proportionate return for
his capital. An illustration of a situation where difficulty can arise is
a family partnership agreement between father and son, which pro-
vides for a sharing of the profits of the father's former business with
no provision for compensation for services. A too literal applica-
tion of the section might lead to the conclusion that the father, the
donor, must be taxed upon a reasonable compensation for himself
plus his share of the profits, without regard to any compensation for
the donee son. 40 The section states expressly that distributive shares
are not to be diminished by absence due to military service. A fortiori,
if there is no absence of services, but actual services by the donee part-
ner, those services should be considered before making any reallocation.
Another approach to effect this sensible result is to keep in mind
that compensation can be paid or provided for in the form of profits.
Thus, if the father and son perform services of equal value, no specific
provision with respect to compensation would mean that they are re-
ceiving their compensation in the form of profits. Take the case where
the capital interests are in the ratio of 3/4 and Y4, and profits are dis-
tributable in the same proportion. If the father's services as com-
pared to the son's are in that same ratio, the father would be receiving
reasonable compensation in his share of the profits. If, however, rea-
sonable compensation to the father would be substantially in excess
of a ratio of 4 to 34, then it would be appropriate to consider that
the father is not receiving reasonable compensation to the extent of
such excess. Thus, in this illustration, if the father's services were
worth $40,000, and the son's $4,000, it could be said that the father
was getting some compensation in his portion of the profits. Accord-
ingly, $44,000 of the profits can be said to be the compensation of
the father and the son, but since it was shared in the ratio of 3/4 to
40. The legislative history shows that the Congressional intent was otherwise. "In
such cases a reasonable allowance will be made for the services rendered by the
partners, and the balance of the income will be allocated according to the amount of
capital which the several partners have invested!' H.R. RFP. No. 586, 82d Cong.,
1st Sess. 34 (1951).
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Y, or $33,000 and $11,000, there should be a reallocation by adding
to the father's distributive share the sum of $7,000.
This administrative problem is only one of the complications
brought on by this new feature of the law. There is, of course, the
very serious matter of determining what amount is a reasonable com-
pensation under all the facts of the case. Heretofore, the collector
has worried about reasonable compensation by attempting to cut it
down in the case of officers of close corporations. Yet, in this in-
stance the tax collector's position will be the reverse, in that he will
assert that the amount received by the former owner is not enough to
constitute reasonable compensation. Much can be written on this
subject alone; but it is again submitted that the situation calls for
good administration, so that there will be a demand for reallocation
only in the case where the partnership provisions, as a whole, are
clearly unreasonable in disregarding the value of the services of the
original owner.
The reallocation of profits is also directed when the agreement
gives a greater proportionate return of profits on capital to a donee
than to a donor. The father who gives his son a 1/10 interest in the
partnership, and yet tries to give him 1/3 of the profits because of
the son's capital interest will have to add the difference between 1/10
and 1/3 of the profits to his own taxable income. Of course, if serv-
ices are performed without compensation provided therefor, then the
same problem just referred to exists in determining to what extent
the partner is receiving a share of profits in lieu of compensation for
services. In such instances only the sum in excess of compensation
for services is to be considered as the share attributable to capital.
Much difficulty will be avoided in the future if family partnership agree-
ments make provision for the payment of compensation for services
of partners. Such compensation can be either a fixed sum or a per-
centage of the profits, or a combination of the two.
Still one other problem is created by the new section. It pur-
portedly deals only with partnership interests created by gift or by
purchase from a family member. Many partnerships are created
merely by a contract which specifically calls for no purchase or gift
of an interest. The language used in section 191 is not too satisfactory
insofar as it deals kith a partnership which is newly formed. Astute
counsel may well argue that when a sole proprietor forms a partnership
with a member of the family, there is rarely a partnership interest
created by gift, and never a purchase of a partnership interest. Thus,
it will be contended that when a partnership is formed by the putting
up of capital or services or both, the relationship ensues or is created
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because of the partnership agreement and not because of any gift or
purchase. Taxation, however, is a practical matter, and courts will
not permit the niceties of legal conveyancing to affect the result. It
would appear, therefore, that the new section will'be applied to family
partnerships whether new interests in an existing partnership are cre-
ated or the partnership is newly created, and whether or not it is con-
tended that the case presents no element of gift or purchase of a part-
nership interest.
3. The Retrospective Effect of the Legislation
The family partnership changes in the Revenue Act of 1951 are
stated to be applicable with respect to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1950. As to prior taxable years, there is an express
statement that no inference is to be drawn from the enactment or
from the date set for it to go into effect. Such a super-cautious hands-
off policy is in direct contrast to the defeated Senate suggestion that
the legislation be made retroactive under certain circumstances to tax-
able years after 1938. The suggestion was refused, notwithstanding
the recognition that "the settlement of many cases in the field is being
held up by" the tax collector.41 A Senate suggestion was accepted,
however, to make clear that when partners and the partnership had
different taxable years, the Act would be effective as to 1951 taxable
years of the partners, only if the distributive share of no partner would
be includible in a 1950 return.
The first part of the legislation deals only with the question of
the recognition of family partnerships, and, as pointed out above,
is in effect declaratory of the rule adopted by most of the courts. It
would seem, therefore, that despite the unusual provisions as to effective
date, any old disputes, presently existing as to the validity of family
partnerships, will be settled in accord with the rule declared in the
new legislation.
A much more serious problem is presented as to reallocation of
income, as provided for by the new section 191. Although as stated
earlier, the Supreme Court has never expressly acted on the issue, it
does appear that the new provision effects a complete change. Courts,
therefore, will in all likelihood refuse to uphold any reallocation of
partnership income in disregard of the partnership agreement as to
taxable years prior to January 1, 1951.
The reallocation provided for in the new section appears to be
applicable, under the stated circumstances, to any family partnership.
41. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1951).
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With that assumption, an issue as to taxes for 1951 or for later years
will exist whether the partnership was formed in 1951 or earlier.
This may open hosts of new problems for existing family partnerships
of long standing. The original owner who is still active in the business
may find his taxes substantially increased because a decade ago he
agreed to run the partnership without any specific compensation. Then,
again, it could mean that each year the whole situation must be re-
examined to see whether, under the facts of the current year, the com-
pensation allowed to the owner is reasonable.
One way of avoiding a good number of these issues is to take
the position that there is to be reallocation only if at the time the
family partnership was created, adequate provision was not made for
the services of the donor. If the agreement, under all the circumstances
existing at the time it was made, contained provisions to give the donor
reasonable compensation, it is not material that future developments
have brought about a situation which makes that compensation very
low. Obviously, an annual compensation of $5,000 for the former
owner as fixed in 1937 by the partnership agreement might not be rea-
sonable compensation under 1951 standards. That, however, does not
appear to be the kind of situation in which Congress intended to im-
pose an additional tax on the original proprietor.
Another method of approach which might be urged upon the
courts is that section 191 must be construed prospectively except in-
sofar as it is expressly made retroactive. Accordingly, it will be urged
that although it is made applicable to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1950, it cannot be applied to partnership arrangements
in existence prior to that date. This argument, however, overlooks
the point that the legislation is a tax measure and not a regulatory
measure. When it refers to income of partnerships created by gift,
it means prospective income only, except to the extent that it is ex-
pressly made retroactive, but it does not mean that the reference is
only to prospective or newly created partnerships. The fair assump-
tion, therefore, is that section 191 will be applied even to old family
partnerships.
CONCLUSION
Upon final analysis it would appear that Congress has done a
satisfactory job in trying to cope with this serious problem which has
been confronting the courts. Congress has made it sufficiently clear
that family partnerships are not to be disregarded for tax purposes
merely because a member owns his partnership interest as the result
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of a direct or indirect gift from the former owner of the interest or of
the business. There may be criticism from an economic or from a
legislative drafting standpoint, as to the provision for the reallocation
of income in disregard of the partnership agreement; but, to a sub-
stantial degree, any real objection can be cured by sound administrative
policy.
